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Abstract 
The categorial approach to evidential reasoning 
can be seen as a combination of the probability 
kinematics approach of Richard Jeffrey (1965) and 
the maximum (cross-) entropy inference approach 
of E. T. Jaynes (1957). As a consequence of that 
viewpoint, it is well known that category theory 
provides natural definitions for logical 
connectives. In particular, disjunction and 
conjunction are modelled by general categorial 
constructions known as products and coproducts. 
In this paper, I focus mainly on Dempster-Shafer 
theory of belief functions for which I introduce a 
category I call Dempster's category. I prove the 
existence of and give explicit formulas for 
conjunction and disjunction in the subcategory of 
separable belief functions. In Dempster's category, 
the new defined conjunction can be seen as the 
most cautious con junction of beliefs, and thus no 
assumption about distinctness (of the sources) of 
beliefs is needed as opposed to Dempster's rule of 
combination, which calls for distinctness (of the 
sources) of beliefs. 
0 INTRODUCTION 
J. Halpern and R. Fagin have pointed out [90 p.102] that 
belief functions can be understood in 'two useful and quite 
different ways ... The first as a generalized probability ... 
The second as a way of representing evidence ... (i.e.) as a 
mapping from probability functions to probability 
functions'. This can be interpreted by saying that a belief 
function can be seen either as a static object (i.e., as a state 
of mind) or as a dynamic entity (i.e., as an evidence 
transforming a state of mind into another state of mind). 
The idea of putting together a static component with a 
dynamic one is not at all a new idea ( cf. [Horvitz, 
1 The following text presents some research results of the Belgian 
National incentive-program for fundamental research in artificial 
intelligence initiated by the Belgian State, Prime Minister's Office, 
Science Policy Programming. The scientific responsibility is assumed 
by the author. 
Heckerman 86] for a nice survey of this idea). In 1965, 
Richard Jeffrey coined the term probability kinematics to 
emphasize the idea, although probability dynamics would 
have been a better term. 
Actually, there exists a basic and simple mathematical 
structure encompassing the two foregoing views of belief 
functions: the category structure [Mac Lane 71]. The link 
between evidential reasoning and category theory can be 
best summarized by the so-called Meseguer-Montanari 
correspondence [Marti-Oliet, Meseguer 89]: 
States � Objects 
Transitions � Morphisms 
where the set of states is a set of admissible belief states 
(or opinions) :>nd the transitions from one belief state to a 
second belief state are the elements of a set of admissible 
updatings (or adjustment of opinions) transforming the 
first state into the second one. 
I see two reasons for adopting a categorial viewpoint about 
evidential reasoning. The first one is related to the 
probability kinematics viewpoint, and the second one is 
related the maximum entropy inference approach to 
evidential reasoning. Actually, a category can be seen as an 
abstract view of a dynamic system of beliefs according to 
the probability kinematics viewpoint. An abstract point of 
view about beliefs has been advocated among others by 
Domotor [85]. Although the viewpoint adopted by 
Domotor is different from ours, the kind of structure he 
used - a monoid2 of evidence operating3 on a set of belief 
states, which is essentially the abstract view of a machine 
- always determines, in a natural way, a category. The 
second and more important reason for adopting a categorial 
viewpoint is: a very powerful way of defining objects is 
by using universal properties which is a generalization of 
defining objects by maximum entropy methods. Defining 
an object by a universal property is the categorist's way to 
defining an object by a maximum (or minimum) principle. 
Any mathematical objects defined by such a maximum 
principle live in a category. I also should mention that 
2 A monoid is a set along with a binary operation that is associative 
and has a neutral element 1. 
3 A monoid (M, *) operates on a set S iff every element m of M 
determines a transformation m. of the set S such that for every 
elements m,n of M and for every element s of S: <m::n)(s) = m(n(s)) 
and l(s) = s 
there already exits a maximum (or minimum) property 
principle known as Principle of Minimum of Specificity 
[Dubois, Prade 87a, 87b], Principle of Minimum 
Commitment [Hsia 91], or Principle of Maximum 
Plausibility [Smets 91] playing an increasing role in 
Dempster-Shafer theory. Nevertheless, the principle I will 
be using is not the former one and could be called the least 
(or most) updated principle. 
The present paper is structured as following. Section 1 
gives a detailed definition of categories. Section 2 presents 
the Boolean, the Bayesian and the Dempsterian categories 
of beliefs. Section 3 shows how conjunction and 
disjunction can be defined by using a maximum (or 
minimum) principle. Section 4 gives the definition of 
coproduct and conjunction in any category. Then, section 5 
presents the product and disjunction. Finally, in section 6, 
I study the conjunction and disjunction of separable beliefs 
functions. 
The product (disjunction) and coproduct (conjunction) of 
beliefs can be considered as an answer to questions raised 
by P.W. Williams [78, p.383] in his review of Shafer's 
book [76]. 
Some categorial approaches to probability theory and to 
evidential reasoning have already been proposed. Let us 
just mention F.W. Lawvere [Giry 82], Negoita [85], 
Goodman and Nguyen [85], Gardenfors [88]. Contrary to 
evidential reasoning, the categorial study of fuzzy sets is 
now - since the work of J. Goguen [69] - a well 
established part of fuzzy set theory. 
The problem of combining non-distinct experts opinions 
has already been examined in several papers, among them: 
[Smets 86], [Dubois, Prade 87b], [Hummel, Manevitz 87], 
[Ling, Rudd 89a,89b], [Wong, Lingras 90] and [Hau, 
Kashyap 90]. 
As the categorial framework is not very common among 
people concerned with evidential reasoning, this paper will 
be more expository than technical. Only a few technical 
results will be given and only very elementary notions of 
category theory will be presented and applied to evidential 
reasoning. 
1 FROM THE DYNAMICS OF BELIEFS TO 
CATEGORIES OR ... VICE VERSA 
The present section can be considered as an introduction to 
the idea of category for belief-minded people or as an 
introduction to the idea of probability kinematics for 
category-minded people. As a category is essentially a 
graph-theoretical structure I first need to give a precise 
definition of a graph (in fact of a directed multigraph): 
Definition: a graph is defined by the following data: 
1. a pair of classes P and A (whose elements are 
respectively called points and arrows or objects and 
morphisms or ... states and transitions ... according to our 
motivations) 
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2. together with a pair of maps s,t: A � P (the maps s 
and t are called source and large/ or origin and extremity or 
... initial stale and final state). 
Some comments are worth mentioning: 
1. The class P can be seen as the static component, 
whereas the class A can be seen as the dynamic component 
of the graph structure. 
2. The static and dynamic components are linked together 
by the maps s and t, specifying the initial and final state of 
each arrow. 
3. f: a � b means that f is an arrow whose source or 
initial state is a and whose target or final state is b. That 
is: fE A and s(f)=a and t(f)=b. 
4. All arrows are directed: they all have an initial point and 
a final point. (directed graph) 
5. Many arrows can share the same initial state and the 
same final state. (multi graph) 
Definition: 
a category is defined by the following data: 
1. a graph s,t: A � P, together with: 
2. a map i: P � A : a � ia . The arrow ia: a � a is called 
the identity arrow at the point a 
3. a partial map, called composition, 
c: AxA � A: (f,g) � c(f,g)=f.g, f.g is called the 
composite of the arrows f and g (f.g is written in 
diagrammatic order), f.g is defined iff the target of f equals 
the source of g. 
The preceding data must satisfy the following two 
axioms: for all points a,b and c and all arrows 
f: a � b, g: b � c and h: c � d 
(i) (f.g).h = f.(g.h) (associativity of composition) 
(ii) ia.f = f = f.ib (identities are neutral for composition) 
Intuitively, a category is simply a (directed multi-) graph 
together with a composition rule for queueing arrows 
satisfying associativity and with a neutral arrow at each 
point. 
Examples: Many examples of categories can be classified 
according to some correspondences. 
1. The major examples and motivations at the origins of 
category theory (in the 40's) were dominated by the 
following correspondence which could be called the Klein 
correspondence (after the famous Felix Klein 1872 
Erlangen Program) : 
Structures � Objects 
Representations � Morphisms 
It is the Klein correspondence which has popularized the 
view of category as a meta-structure. But, I hasten to add 
that it is not the only possible view of categories. 
Just two very classical examples: 
(l) SET is the category whose objects are the sets, whose 
arrows are the usual functions, and the composition is the 
usual composition of functions. Instead of taking 
functions as arrows I could as well take the relations or the 
partial functions as arrows (in that case we are, of course, 
getting different categories). 
(2) RVECT is the category whose objects are the real 
vector spaces, whose arrows are the linear mappings, and 
the composition is the usual composition of mappings. 
176 Kennes 
In fact, any kind of structure together with a suitable 
notion of (homo)morphism give rise straightforward to a 
category. 
2. In the late sixties appeared the Lambek-Lawvere 
co"espondence: 
Formulas � Objects 
Proofs� Morphisms 
also leading to categories. See [Marti-Oliet, Meseguer 89] 
3. Taking into account with [Garvey, Lowrance, Fischler 
81], [Hsia 90] and [Provan 90] that a belief function can be 
considered as a generalized formula and that an updating 
can be considered as a generalized proof (cf.[Pearl 88,90]), 
then we get the next correspondence: 
Belief States � Objects 
Updating � Morphisms 
This can also be seen as a particular case of the M eseguer­
Montanari correspondence (about concurrent systems) 
which appeared in the late eighties [Marti-Oliet, Meseguer 
89]: States � Objects 
Transitions � Morphisms 
In particular that correspondence associates a category to 
any machine. 
4. Many important examples of categories do not fit into 
the preceding correspondences. A category can also be 
viewed as a common generalization of an algebraic 
structure: the monoids, and of an ordered structure: the 
preordered sets4. Explicitly, any monoid can be viewed as a 
category with only one object (take any object you want), 
the arrows are the elements of the monoid. Composition is 
the binary operation of the monoid. Any preordered set can 
be viewed as a category. The objects are the elements of 
the set and the arrows are the ordered pairs (a,b) of the 
preorder. In particular any ordered set5 and any lattice6 are 
(or can be viewed as) categories. Every monoid operating 
on a set (such an operation can be viewed as a machine) 
gives rise to a category in the following way: the objects 
are the elements of the set, and the arrows are the triples 
(a,m,b) where a and bare elements of the set and m is an 
element of the monoid such that m(a)=b. So, Domotor's 
[80] viewpoint is embedded is the categorial viewpoint. 
2 CATEGORIES OF "BELIEFS" 
I want to show here that there exist a lot of categories of 
"beliefs". That is, categories whose objects can be thought 
of as representing belief states (or opinions) of a cognitive 
agent concerning a particular situation. The general idea is 
the following one: If I adopt an abstract viewpoint of what 
should be a system of beliefs (of a cognitive agent), 
concerning a particular situation, I find natural to: 
4 A preodered set is a set along with a binary relation which is 
reflexive and transitive. 
5 An ordered set is a set along with a binary relation which is 
reflexive, transitive and antisymmetric. 
6 A lattice is an ordered set in which every pair of elements has an 
infimum and a supremum. 
(i) first, consider a set of admissible belief states -
whatever this term actually means -which can be taken by 
an agent, concerning the specific situation at hand. 
(ii) second, consider a set of admissible updatings -
whatever this term actually means- (determined by some 
evidence), transforming a belief state into another belief 
state. 
(iii) third, the composition of two updatings should be an 
updating, 
(iv) for each belief state there should exist a trivial 
updating, i.e., the one doing nothing. 
We will get a category of beliefs each time we make clear 
each of the above notions which have been left vague. 
Here are some major examples: 
The Boolean category of beliefs (induced from a special 
case of Boolean machines of [Domotor 80, p. 391] by the 
Meseguer-Montanari correspondence). 
Let us consider a (finite or infinite) set Q which can be 
interpreted as a set of possible values for a variable, or 
possible answers to a question. The boolean category of 
beliefs on Q is defmed by the following data: 
(i) the objects are the subsets of Q, i.e., the elements of 
pn, 
(ii) the arrows X: A � B are the subsets X of Q such that 
Xr.A= B, 
in other words X: A � B iff Xr.A = B 
(iii) the composite of X: A � B and Y: B � C is 
Xr.Y: A �C 
(iv) the identity arrow at A is Q: A � A. 
Intuitively, the Boolean category of beliefs on Q can be 
explained the following way: the only admissible belief 
states that can be entertained are of the kind: I believe that 
the answer to the question is in subset X. The only 
admissible updatings are those representing the following 
kind of reasoning: 11 I believe that the answer to the 
question is in subset A, and.Jf. I get an evidence which 
makes me believe that the answer is in subset X, 1hm I 
will believe that the answer to the question is in subset 
XnA. 
The Bayesian category of beliefs (induced from Bayesian 
machines of [Domotor 80, p. 390] by the Meseguer­
Montanari correspondence). 
The Bayesian category of beliefs (on a set Q) is defined 
according to the following definition [Teller 73, p.218]: 'I 
take bayesianism to be the doctrine which maintains that 
(i) a set of reasonable beliefs can be represented by a 
probability function defined over sentences or 
propositions, and that (ii) reasonable changes of belief can 
be represented by a process called conditionalization '. 
Let Q be a (finite or infinite) set which can be interpreted 
as a set of possible values for a variable, or possible 
answers to a question. The Bayesian category of beliefs on 
Q is defined by the following data: 
(i) the objects are the probability functions P: p Q � 
[0,1], i.e., the functions satisfying the well known 
Kolmogorov axioms, 
(ii) the arrows X: P � Q are the subsets X of Q such that 
Q = P(.IX) 
(iii) the composition of X: P � Q and Y: Q � R is 
XnY:P�R 
(iv) the identity arrow at P is Q: P � P. 
So, the only admissible belief states represented by this 
category are those represented by a probability function on 
n. The only admissible updatings are those representing 
the following kind of reasoning: U my belief state (about a 
situation) is represented by the probability function P, and 
if I get an evidence which makes me believe that the 
answer is in subset X, lhfll my new belief state will be 
represented by the conditional probability function P(. /X). 
Dempster's category of <unnormalized) beliefs 
A new kind of category of beliefs was proposed by A. 
Dempster in the late sixties, and exposed in the seminal 
work of G. Shafer [76]. 
Let us first review the two basic notions of Dempster­
Shafer theory of belief functions. 
The set n is finite, and pn denotes its power set. 
(I) A mass distribution m on the set n is any function: 
m: pn � [0 1] such that I m(X) = 1 
XepQ 
(2) The key point of the theory is provided by the so-called 
Dempster's rule of combination. It is a binary operation 
defined on the set of mass distributions on a set 0: given 
two mass distributions m 1 and m2, the rule provides a 
new mass distribution denoted by m 1 181m2: 
VAE pn: m1®mlA) = I m1(X)-m2(Y) 
Xr�Y=A 
This product is in fact nothing else than the convolution 
product of the semi-group algebra of (.f.JO,n). Before I 
describe Dempster's category of beliefs, let us note that 
each subset X of n determines a mass distribution denoted 
by 1(X) = pn � [0,1] and defined by 1(Xj(X)= 1. I are 
now ready to describe what I call Dempster's category of 
(unnormalized) beliefs. As usual, let n be a finite set 
which can be interpreted as a set of possible values for a 
variable, or possible answers to a question. Dempster's 
category of beliefs on n is defined by the following data: 
(i) the objects are the mass distributions m: pn � [0,1], 
(ii) the arrows e: m 1 � m2 are the mass distributions e 
such that: e®m 1 = m2, 
(iii) the composite of e1: m1 � m2 and e2: m2 � m3 is 
e1®e2: m1 � m3 
(iv) the identity arrow at m is I { n]: m � m. 
Some comments are needed: 
I. Any mass distribution m is bijectively represented by 
its Mobius transform also called its belief function bclm 
defined by: 
VAE pn : bel (A) = I m(X) = I m(X) 
m Xe pA-{0} XQ\.X-0 
A belief function is sometimes used instead of its mass 
distribution and vice versa. 
2. In Dempster's unnormalized category, the belief states 
are represented by mathematical objects that are in fact 
generalized probability functions (see [Fagin, Halpern 89]). 
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But, what makes the situation more intricate is that the 
updatings (induced by evidences) are represented by the 
same kind of mathematical objects as belief states are. So, 
in this framework the phrase of Halpern and Fagin [90, 
p. 102] receives its full meaning, namely that belief 
functions can be understood in 'two useful and quite 
different ways ... The first as a generalized probability ... 
The second as a way of representing evidence ... (i.e.) as a 
mapping from probability functions to probability 
functions'. 
3. Another point is the difference between updating and 
combination: An updating (transition) is an arrow from a 
belief state to a belief state, whereas the combination is 
the composition rule, operating on the arrows of the 
category. As stressed by Halpern and Fagin [90, p.l l5] : 
'The key point is that updating and combining are different 
processes; what makes sense in one context does not 
necessarily make sense in the other.' And, p.112 : 'It 
makes sense to think of updating a belief if we think of it 
as a generalized probability. On the other hand, it makes 
sense to combine two beliefs (using, say, Dempster' rule 
of combination) only if we think of the belief functions as 
representing evidence'. 
4. It is well known that the rule of combination of beliefs 
is (said to be) valid in case the 'beliefs functions to be 
combined are actually based on entirely distinct bodies of 
evidence' [Shafer 76, p. 57]. 
5. It is obvious how Dempster's category of beliefs should 
be interpreted: the belief states are represented by mass 
distributions (or equivalently by belief functions) on n. 
The updatings represent the following kind of reasoning: lJ 
my belief state is represented by the mass distribution B. 
cmd...if I get an evidence - based on a body of evidence 
entirely distinct from the body of evidence on which is 
based my belief state - represented by the mass 
distribution E.lhm. my new belief state will be represented 
by the mass distribution E ®B. 
Dempster's category of (normalized) beliefs 
The differences between this category and the unnormalized 
Dempster's category of beliefs are the following ones: 
(i) the mass distributions are asked to satisfy m(0)=0. 
(ii) Dempster product has to be normalized, cf [Shafer 76]. 
Remark: there exist numerous other categories whose 
objects are belief functions (or mass distributions). The 
reader will easily define the weak-inclusion category of 
beliefs and the strong-inclusion category or Yager's 
category of beliefs. The main difference between the former 
categories and the latter ones is that the arrows of the 
former categories are not induced by evidence. In other 
words, their arrows are more descriptive than operative. 
The two before mentioned categories have already be 
somehow studied by Yager [86], Dubois and Prade 
[86,87b,90] and by Kruse and Schwecke [91]. According to 
the philosophy of category theory, and as observed by 
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Dubois and Prade [90, p.423], these different categories 
'correspond to different views of belief functions '. 
3 DISJUNCTIONS AND CONJUNCTIONS 
A slogan for this section could be: define the logical 
connectives in terms of minimum (or maximum) 
principles, i.e., by using universal properties. 
For example, the union and intersection (i.e., disjunction 
and conjunction) of two sets A and B can be defined 
without referring to the elements of the sets, using only 
the inclusion relation, in the following way: 
AuB is the set included in all sets including A and B, 
AnB is the set including all sets included in A and B. 
Keeping in mind the above example here is, I believe, the 
essence of the conjuction and disjunction of two pieces of 
information: 
(I) the conjunction is the piece of information contained in 
all pieces of information containing the two given pieces 
of information. More intuitively: it is the most cautious 
(minimal) piece of information containing the two given 
pieces of information. 
(2) the disjunction is the piece of information containing 
all pieces of information contained in the two given pieces 
of information. More intuitively: it is the most lllllil 
(maximal) piece of information contained in the two given 
pieces of information. 
Since Jaynes (1957), a usual approach (at least for 
conjunction) is the maximum (cross-) entropy inference or 
the minimum information (gain) inference approach, 
which I shall not recall here. That approach can be 
described as a quantitative approach, although only the 
order relation is used. Another approach, which can be 
described as a qualitative approach, is the categorial 
approach. Actually, the minimum information (gain) 
inference approach can be seen as a particular case of the 
categorial approach. The categorial approach - or better: 
the universal property approach - is the following: (i) a 
piece of information is interpreted as an object of a 
category (whose object can be thought of as representing 
belief states or information states), (ii) A is contained in B 
is interpreted as an arrow X: A� B of the category. The 
conjunction is then represented by a construction called the 
coproduct in the category and the disjunction is represented 
by another construction called the product in the category. 
4 COPRODUCTS AND CONJUNCTIONS 
Let us first define the simplest example of object defined 
by a universal property: initial object of a category. 
Definition: an initial object of a category is an 
object I such that for any object X (of the category) there 
is a unique arrow (of the category) : I� X. 
Properties and examples: 
I. It can be shown very easily that all initial objects of a 
category are isomorphic (that is: if I 1 and I2 are two initial 
objects,then there exist an arrow f:I l  � I2 and an arrow 
g:I2 � II such that f.g=in (the identity arrow at II) and 
g.f=ii2 (the identity arrow at I2). 
2. The reader will verify at once that the vacuous belief 
function l(O} is the (only) initial object in Dempster's 
( unnormalized or normalized) category. 
3. An initial object can also be defined as a colimit of the 
empty diagram [Goldblatt 84, p. 60]. So, if one knows 
nothing (represented by the empty diagram, as suggested 
by Negoita [85, p. 8]), the most cautious belief state is the 
vacuous belief function 1 { o}. 
4. It is easy to verify that Bayes category has no initial 
object 
5. The only initial object of Boole category (on 0) is 0. 
6. The initial object of an ordered set is its minimum (if it 
exists). 
Let us now consider two objects A and B of a category. A 
coproduct of A and B is an object A+B along with two 
arrows inA: A� A+B and ins: B � A+B, expressing 
how A+B is related to A and B, satisfying a particular 
universal property. Intuitively, A+B represents the fusion 
or aggregation or integration of A and B in the most 
cautious way, according to the arrows of the category 
being considered. Here is the definition: 
Definition: Let us give two objects A and B (of a 
category) 
A e e B 
A coproduct of A and B is an object denoted by A+B, 
along with two arrows: 
inA: A� A+B and ins: B � A+B 
A+B 
in A in 8 
A I' "'. B 
such that for every other object C along with two arrows 
f: A � C and g: B � C 
c 
A� B 
there exists a unique arrow o.: A+B � C such that the 
following diagram commutes: (i.e., inA.O.=f and ins.o.=g) 
Properties: 
I. It can be shown very easily that all coproducts of a 
given pair of objects are isomorphic. 
2. [MacLane 71, p. 72-74]: up to isomorphism, the 
coproduct is an operation satisfying the following 
properties: (i) Associativity, (ii) Commutativity, (iii) 
Every initial object is neutral, (iv) Idempotent if the 
category is a preorder. To say that a category is a preorder 
is equivalent to saying that it has at· most one arrow 
between an ordered pair of objects, it is also trivially 
equivalent to say that every diagram of the category 
commutes. 
3. The initial object of a category can be seen to be the 
coproduct of ... no object! 
4. A priori, there is no guarantee for a pair of objects in a 
category to have a coproduct A category is said to have 
binary products if the product of any two objects exists. It 
is not always a trivial task to show that a category has 
binary products. 
For classical examples of coproducts the reader is referred 
to the literature on category theory. Let us here consider 
the category (f.J 0,;;2) which is well known to be a 
Boolean lattice. The objects are the subsets of 0, and the 
arrows are the ordered pairs (A,B) such that A ;;:2 B. The 
reader can easily verify that the coproduct of A and B is 
AnB (together with the inclusions A ;;:2 AnB and B ;;:2 
An B). It is trivial to see that in any lattice the coproduct 
of the elements a and b is the supremum or least upper 
bound of a and b. 
Let us now examine what happens in our Boolean category 
of beliefs (on the set 0). So, let us take two states A and 
B of the category, at first sight the coproduct of A and B 
should be AnB, unfortunately the reader may verify that 
we get some problems in trying to get commutative 
diagrams which are asked by the definition of coproduct. 
The easiest way out of that problem is to consider that all 
diagrams of the category do commute! Formally, this can 
be done by identifying all arrows going from one state to 
another state - that is, by performing a quotient of the 
category. In that way we obtain a new category - called the 
preorder of the category - which, in the present case, is 
(isomorphic to) the Boolean lattice (f.J 0,;;:2). As the 
Boolean lattice (f.J 0,;;2) essentially reflects the logic of the 
Boolean category, I will call the preorder of a category its 
logic (warning: this is not a standard definition). 
Thus, with the preceding definition we can say that the 
logic of the Boolean category is a Boolean logic. We can 
perform the same quotient with Dempster's categories to 
get the logics of Dempster's categories. 
Here are the details of the definition of the logics of the 
two Dempster's categories: 
(i) the objects are the mass distributions m: pO---) [0,1], 
(ii) there is only one arrow m1 ---) m2 iff there exists at 
least one "evidence" (mass distribution) e such that: e®m 1 
= m2, otherwise there does not exist any arrow m 1 ---) m2. 
(iii) the composition rule and (iv) the identity arrows are 
then uniquely defined. 
Dempster's rule of combination is normalized or not 
according to the category being considered. 
Definition: Given two objects A and B of a category, 
the conjunction AAB is the coproduct of A and B in the 
logic of the category. 
More informally, with the vocabulary of "beliefs", the 
definition of conjunction is the following: the conjunction 
of two belief states A and B is the least (or more precisely: 
any least) common updated belief state of A and of B. 
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'Least' means that any other common updated belief state 
of A and B is an updated state of the conjunction of A and 
B. The conjunction is thus commutative, associative and 
idempotent. Moreover, in Dempster's categories the 
vacuous belief state is neutral for conjunction. 
Because of the minimality property of the conjunction 
there is no need to assume distinctness (of the sources) of 
the combined beliefs. 
Remark: Kruse and Schwecke [91] have succeeded in 
building a category, whose objects are belief functions and 
whose arrows are specializations - a generalization of 
Yager's inclusion [86] - in which ll conjunction of A and 
B is Dempster's combination of A and B. At first sight 
this is a remarkable result! Unfortunately, because there 
are (too) many isomorphisms in Kruse's category, being a 
conjunction in that category does not characterize 
Dempster's rule of combination at all. 
5 PRODUCTS AND DISJUNCTIONS 
The dual notion of initial object is terminal object. 
Definition: a terminal object of a category is an 
object T such that for any object X there is a unique arrow 
X-)T. 
The only terminal object of the logic of the Boolean 
category of beliefs is the empty set 0 which plays the role 
of the constant FALSE. The reader will verify at once that 
the belief state defined by m(0) = 1 is the (only) terminal 
object in the logic of Dempster's unnormalized category. I 
call that belief function the total contradiction, which 
plays, in this logic, the role of the boolean constant 
FALSE. Contrary to the unnormalized case, the logic of 
Dempster's normalized category has no terminal object 
(i.e., the constant FALSE is not represented in that 
category). 
The product of two objects in a category is simply the 
coproduct in the dual category (i.e., the objects are the 
same but the arrows are reversed). Historically, products 
were first recognized which explains the word (;Q!Jroduct. 
Let us now consider two objects A and B of a category. A 
product of A and B is an object AxB along with two 
arrows pA: AxB ---)A and PB: AxB---) B (called the 
projections), expressing how AxB is related to A and B, 
and satisfying a universal property. Intuitively, an 
interpretation of AxB is the biggest common part of A and 
B according to the arrows of the category being considered. 
The exact definition is the following: 
Definition: Let us give two objects A and B (of a 
category) 
A • e B 
A product of A and B is an object denoted by AxB, along 
with two arrows PA: AxB---) A and PB: AxB---) B 
A � / B 
P,\V PB 
A xB 
such that for every other object C (of the category) along 
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with two arrows f: C � A and g: C � B 
A v. B 
c 
there exists a unique arrow a.: C � AxB such that the 
following diagram commutes: (i.e., a..pA=f and a..pB=g) 
A
'
� � 
c 
The properties of products are dual to those of 
coproducts. So, I will only remember the most important 
ones: up to isomorphism, the product is an operation 
satisfying the following properties: (i) Associativity, (ii) 
Commutativity, (iii) Every terminal object is neutral, (iv) 
Idempotent if the category is a preorder. 
The reader can verify that, in the category (p!l,;;;l), the 
product of A and B is AuB (together with the inclusions 
AuB ;;;1 A and AuB ;;;1 B). The preceding example easily 
extends to any lattice in which the product of the elements 
a and b is the infimum or greatest lower bound of a and b. 
Definition: Given two objects A and B of a category, 
the disjunction AvB is the product of A and B in the 
logic of the category. 
More informally, with the vocabulary of "beliefs", the 
definition of disjunction is the following: the disjunction 
of two belief states A and B is the m o st (or more 
precisely: any most) updated belief state, such that A and B 
are updated states of it. 'Most' means that the disjunction 
of A and B is an updated state of any state which can be 
updated into A and B. The disjunction is thus 
commutative, associative, and idempotent. Moreover, in 
the logic of Dempster's unnormalized category of beliefs 
the total contradiction is neutral for the disjunction, which 
fits well with the idea that the total contradiction contains 
all informations. 
6 SEPARABLE BELIEF FUNCTIONS 
In this last section I consider only Dempster's 
unnormalized category and restrict ourselves to the 
subcategory whose objects and arrows are separable belief 
functions. Let us first recall some definitions (see 
[Shafer 76]). The subset A of n is a focal element of the 
belief function belm: pn � [0,1) iff m(A)>O. The belief 
function belm: pn � [0,1) is a simple support function 
iff belm has at most one focal element distinct from n. 
The mass distribution of any simple support function 
belm focused on X# Q will be denoted by mx . More 
explicitly, the mass distribution mx such that mx(X) = a. 
will be denoted by xa.. The mass allocated to Q by xa. is 
thus 1-a.. The vacuous belief function 1 { n} will be 
represented by any expression of the from xO where X is 
not n. Note that 00. denotes a belief function focused on 
the empty set. A separable belief function (called separable 
support function by G. Shafer) is any belief function belm 
such that: 
m= 181 m 
Xep0-(0} X 
Using the just introduced notation we can write: 
m= 181 xnx 
Xep0-(0} 
where a.x = mx(X) 
Dempster's rule of combination gets an interesting form 
for separable belief functions: 
Theorem: Given two separable belief functions, 
181 Xnxand 181 /v 
Xep0-(0} Yep0-(0} 
.I!Kn 
( 181 Xnx) 181 ( 181 /v) = 181 xnx•ilx-nxilx 
Xep0-(0} Yep0-(0} Xep0-(0} 
The next theorem states that the conjunction (/\) and 
disjunction ( v) of two beliefs in the category of separable 
belief functions always exist and are given by the 
following formulas: 
Theorem 7: Given two separable belief functions, 
181 xnx and 181 /v 
Xe p0-(0} Ye p0-(0} 
.I!Kn 
( 181 X Ox) A ( 181 /v ) = 181 Xmax(Ox_.Jlxl 
Xe p0-(0} Ye p0-(0} Xe p0-(0} 
< 181 x
nx ) v ( 181 y�Y) = 181 xmin<nx.
.Jlxl 
Xep0-(0} Yep0-(0} XepQ.(O} 
It is interesting to note that the operations induced on the 
"exponents" by Dempster's rule of combination and the 
conjunction are T-conorms8, and the operation induced by 
the disjunction is a T-norm9. The link between T­
(co)norms and fuzzy logical connectives has been 
recognized since a long time ago. This was first recognized 
by U. Hohle in the late seventies. It can be shown very 
easily that T-(co)norms is a weakened form of the notion 
of categorial (co)products in the category [0,1).�. 
7 CONCLUSIONS 
The key point expressed in the present paper is that 
Dempster's rule of combination is less a conjunctive rule 
7 These two fonnulas - without categorial content - have been brought 
to my attention by Philippe Smets. 
8 A T·cononn is an operation •: [O,I)x[O,I] -> [0,1] which is 
commutative, associative, for which 0 is n eutral, monotonic 
increasing (for the usual order relation$ on [0,1] and the product order 
on [O,l]x[O,l]), and 1•1=1. 
9 A T-nonn is an operation •: [O,l]x[O,!] -> [0,1] which is 
commutative, associative, for which 1 is neutral, mon otonic 
increasing, and 0•0=0. 
(of belief states) than the composition rule of a category 
(composition of evidence). Such a point of view has lead 
to conjunction and a disjunction for belief functions. 
Explicit formulas have been given for separable belief 
functions. 
The former key point may also explain a difference 
between fuzzy logic and Dempster-Shafer theory as 
follows. In fuzzy logic there exist numerous "combination 
rules" modelling the logical connectives. People are trying 
to unify them all by finding a category out of which all 
these connectives can emerge naturally. Whereas in 
Dempster-Shafer theory there exists only one combination 
rule, and people are trying to discover a logic (cf. e.g. 
[Dubois, Prade 86]) compatible with the combination rule. 
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